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Abstract  
 
Public Administration scholars and practitioners are paying increased attention to 
“vulnerable citizens” – groups of citizens who, for reasons beyond their control, are 
disadvantaged in comparison to other citizens - when consuming public services. Initial 
research focused on how citizens’ socio-economic background shapes their behaviour 
and satisfaction. Citizens, however, take decisions within a context, but we know little 
about how their experiences differ depending on their country of residence. We 
contribute to the emerging strand of scholarship on citizens’ vulnerability by 
comparatively analysing the experience of vulnerable citizens in the 
telecommunications and electricity markets in three large EU countries, selected to 
represent “advanced”, “intermediate” and “laggard” stages of reform. We first establish 
that citizen socio-economic characteristics matter for patterns of expenditure and 
perceptions of service affordability and then show how citizen vulnerability differs 
depending on country context. Results are useful to practitioners seeking to target 
regulation to improve the experiences of vulnerable citizens.  
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Points for practitioners  
 
Practitioners recognize that public service reform has brought with it greater market 
complexity and choice, and that this poses challenges to citizens, particularly, 
vulnerable citizens. Initial empirical work has analysed how citizens’ socio-economic 
background affects their satisfaction, however, we know little about how vulnerability is 
shaped by country context. We analyse electricity and telecommunications markets in 
three large EU countries, establishing first that consumer socio-economic background 
matters for citizens’ expenditure and perceptions of service affordability, and then 
demonstrate that country context also influences these experiences. Less-educated, 
elderly and non-employed citizens experience more frequent problems with these 
services than other citizens, while the country context conditions these experiences 
significantly. 
 
 
Keywords 
Public infrastructure services, regulation, vulnerable citizens, country differences, 
Behavioural Sciences.  
 
 
4 
 
Introduction 
 
From the late 1980s onwards, public infrastructure services - including 
telecommunications and electricity - underwent significant, market-oriented reform, 
including liberalization, deregulation and privatization policies, across the European 
Union (EU). While the UK was a first mover, most other EU countries followed suit, 
albeit unevenly, by country and sector (Clifton et al., 2006). The stated beneficiaries of 
these reforms were citizens - recast as consumers - who would enjoy greater choice and 
lower prices. Simultaneously, following international trends associated with New Public 
Management, the European Commission (EC) commenced surveying citizens about 
their satisfaction with service performance after reform (Grosso and Van Ryzin, 2012). 
 Gradually, evidence mounted that public infrastructure services reform was 
more complex than first thought (Bel and Warner, 2016; Clifton et al., 2016). From a 
“top-down” perspective, attaining real competition was challenging, as some 
incumbents clung onto market power (Fiorio and Florio, 2011). From the bottom-up – 
or citizen – perspective, reform success had been predicated on an “active consumer”: 
however, the EC (2012) acknowledged that citizens were often less informed and pro-
active than had initially been assumed. Scholars (Clifton et al., 2011, 2014; Jilke, 2015) 
and practitioners (EC, 2012, 2015a; EP, 2012), worried that vulnerable citizen groups 
may be less well positioned than other citizens to deal with newly reformed public 
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infrastructure markets. Since these markets were more complex than previously, due to 
choice, switching, and so on, they may present particular difficulties to vulnerable 
citizens. The salience of the concept of “vulnerable citizens” increased. Andreasen and 
Manning (1990) defined “vulnerable citizens” as those “at a disadvantage in exchange 
relationships where that disadvantage is attributable to characteristics that are largely 
not controllable by them”.   
Practitioners therefore called for more empirical evidence on the experiences of 
vulnerable citizens in diverse markets (Van Bavel et al., 2013), including liberalized 
public service markets (Sousa Lourenço et al., 2016), with a view to implementing 
specific new regulation (EC, 2015b, ECCG, 2013; EP, 2012). Unfortunately, of the EC 
surveys conducted on citizen satisfaction from 2000 onwards – with the singular 
exception of EC (2007) - opinions only of citizens who consumed services were 
recorded. This biased the survey results since opinions of citizens who could not afford 
or access services, or who did not use them for other reasons, were excluded. Hence, we 
focus in this article on the unique data available on all citizens in EC (2007).  
Following Burden (1998), citizen vulnerability is not directly observable. Hence, 
studies on vulnerability use proxies, specifically, socio-economic indicators potentially 
associated with vulnerability, such as age, employment status, race, health, income and 
household tenure. Early research used these proxies to enquire how specific aspects of 
citizens’ socio-economic background were associated with less satisfaction vis-à-vis 
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diverse markets. Since most of these studies were performed at the national level 
(George et al., 2011), country differences were scarcely analysed.  
However, it is important to understand the consequences of citizen vulnerability 
in different country contexts. Following the subsidiarity principle, if problems in 
markets are common across countries, an EU approach to regulation may reduce costs; 
however, where difficulties are heterogeneous, a national, differentiated approach to 
regulation is required. Until recently, scholars neglected to analyse citizen vulnerability 
across countries partly due to methodological challenges (Ferrari and Manzi, 2014). 
Jilke et al. (2015) used multilevel modelling techniques to overcome problems 
presented when respondents in multiple countries answer survey questions in different 
ways.  
We build on the emerging research that seeks to understand the importance of 
country context for citizen vulnerability. We comparatively analyse experiences of 
groups of vulnerable consumers in public service markets across countries. Specifically, 
we analyse whether and how country context - combined with the socio-economic 
background of citizens - shapes experiences of citizen vulnerability, as reflected in 
citizens’ decisions and satisfaction with services. To do so, we contrast information 
about citizens’ expenditure (revealed preferences, RP) with data on citizens’ perceived 
service affordability (stated preferences, SP), following Clifton et al. (2014), to 
comparatively analyse the dynamics of vulnerability in two major public services 
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(telecommunications and electricity) across three large EU countries: the UK, Italy and 
Spain. These countries represent mature, intermediate and laggard reform markets for 
the two services under analysis. The UK represents a “first mover”, having pioneered 
reform of both services in the EU; Italy represents a reform “laggard” in both; and, 
finally, Spain, an “intermediate” case, (following the UK but ahead of Italy). Data 
availability means not all proxies potentially associated with vulnerability can be 
assessed. We proxy vulnerability by three commonly used socio-economic dimensions 
where comparable information is available: education, age and employment. We first 
establish how specific socio-economic characteristics associated with vulnerability 
affect citizens’ expenditure and their perceptions of service affordability. Next, we 
analyse whether differences across the three countries further shape these experiences, 
by introducing interaction effects between countries and each proxy for vulnerability.  
 We find that, in all three countries, citizens’ socio-economic background 
conditions their expenditure decisions and their perceptions of service affordability. The 
experiences of vulnerable citizens in reformed public service markets, when compared 
to the rest of citizens, are reflected in their lower perceptions of service affordability and 
different expenditure decisions, for some services. Next, we show how country context 
matters as regards shaping experiences of vulnerability. In telecommunications, where 
reforms and technological innovations were intense and widespread, we find common 
trends in the experiences of vulnerable citizens in different countries. In electricity, 
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where reforms were more halting and uneven, we find that the experiences of vulnerable 
citizens are more country specific.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section two explains why public 
infrastructure service regulation, originally based on a supply-side perspective, was 
extended to consider citizens’ socio-economic background and the issue of vulnerable 
citizens. Section three describes country context by comparatively analysing different 
reform maturities in telecommunications and electricity. Section four describes the data 
and the empirical approach. Section five interprets the results; conclusions for policy-
making follow. 
 
Public infrastructure service reform: from consumers to vulnerable citizens 
 
Practitioners assumed the market-oriented reform of utilities from the 1980s would 
augment choice and efficiency in service provision. Following neoclassical economics, 
it was presumed the benefits of these reforms would filter down to citizens, recast as 
consumers. Consumers were conceived as rational maximizers of their individual utility 
(homo oeconomicus): they would make an appropriate use of the possibilities of choice 
generated. Consumer satisfaction and social welfare would improve as a consequence 
(EC, 2010).  
9 
 
However, these assumptions were increasingly questioned. Firstly, evidence 
showed that liberalization and privatization were being implemented unevenly by 
country and sector in the EU (Clifton et al., 2006). Even when liberalization was legally 
in place, incumbents were sometimes reluctant to reduce their market share (Florio, 
2014). Secondly, evidence from EC consumer satisfaction surveys suggested that 
satisfaction was not necessarily improving (Bacchiocchi et al., 2011; Fiorio and Florio, 
2011). Results from satisfaction surveys, as well as empirical studies pointing to new 
challenges in markets associated with accessing and switching services, suggested that 
vulnerable citizens may be less well positioned to take advantage of public service 
reform than other groups of citizens (Clifton et al., 2016). Supply-side reform had not 
foregrounded consumer heterogeneity: it was based on the “average consumer”, a 
reasonably well informed and active citizen (ECCG, 2013; Lavrijssen, 2014). European 
documentation started to admit that consumers were not as rational as reformers had 
assumed (ECCG, 2013; EP, 2012).  
From the 2000s, practitioners paid increased attention to the problems that 
vulnerable citizens might face (EC, 2015a; EP, 2012; OECD, 2008). Following Burden 
(1998), vulnerability was not understood as a static, directly observable, phenomenon. 
Instead, specific socio-economic variables were understood as rendering citizens 
potentially vulnerable in certain situations (George et al., 2011; OECD, 2008).  
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Liberalization and deregulation should bring market choice: however, some 
citizens lacked the skills, experience or confidence for optimal decision-making in 
reformed markets (George et al., 2011). Hence, some citizens were taking less-than-
optimal decisions when they chose to use a service or not, conducted a service search, 
switched services or selected a service tariff (Lunn, 2012). Behavioural approaches, 
building on insights from economics and psychology, were invoked by practitioners to 
help explain vulnerable citizens’ experiences. Since the 2000s, insights from 
behavioralism have been increasingly integrated into the social sciences, including 
Public Administration (Tummers et al., 2016). 
Traditionally, two different approaches are used to evaluate public infrastructure 
services from the citizen perspective: RP, information on citizens’ observable choices; 
and SP, citizens' self-evaluation reflected in satisfaction (Van Dooren and Van de 
Walle, 2008). Both approaches have advantages and limitations. The advantage of RP is 
that it provides indicators which are considered relatively objective, such as citizen 
expenditure on a service. However, citizens’ decisions may not always lead to their own 
utility maximization (Tummers et al., 2016). Hence, RP, alone, are insufficient to assess 
individual and social welfare. This is particularly important in the case of public 
infrastructure markets, which are not genuinely competitive, but quasi-markets: hence 
both leaving and switching supplier have a high cost for consumers. The limitation of 
SP is they are based on subjective information and, when analysed alone, do not lead to 
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clear conclusions as regards country comparisons (Jilke et al., 2015). Whitehead et al., 
(2008) showed that RP and SP can best be used as complementary, rather than 
alternative, sources of information, thus exploiting the respective strengths of both. This 
approach facilitates the enriching of data interpretation when analysing the socio-
economic factors associated with consumer vulnerability in public services markets 
(Clifton et al., 2014). 
Behavioural sciences offer various concepts which practitioners can use to better 
understand citizen experiences in public service markets. One example is the status quo 
bias: citizens, rather than being systematically active players in complex markets, are 
biased towards the existing situation, reflected in inertia (Kahneman et al., 1991). Inertia 
may slow down the take-up of new services and switching. Acknowledging this, in 
2009, the EC Consumer Rights Directive recognized the importance of default options. 
Another important behavioural bias is choice overload: an excessive number of options 
makes choice too complex, reducing, rather than increasing, satisfaction (Jilke et al., 
2016). Usually, citizens confront difficult choices by using heuristics (shortcuts for 
taking decisions, instead of exhaustive calculations), which may lead to failures in 
optimal decision-making.  
Empirical evidence shows that groups of vulnerable citizens are more prone to 
experience these behavioural biases, in particular where decision-making is subject to 
complexity (Lunn and Lyons, 2010). Due to inertia, choice overload and/or an 
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inappropriate use of heuristics, vulnerable citizens may take poorer decisions when 
consuming services, reflected in paying a higher unit price. If this occurs and, if their 
consumption (quantity purchased) of the service is unrestricted, we observe: 
H1. Vulnerable groups of citizens perceive services as less affordable, but spend 
more on them. 
Vulnerable citizens such as the less-educated and those not employed are also 
more likely to earn a lower income. It is more likely therefore, they find services 
unaffordable. These citizens may restrict service consumption by purchasing a smaller 
amount (for instance, by limiting the number of phone calls), or purchase a lower 
quality service (such as contracting a poorer internet connection). So: 
H2. Vulnerable groups of citizens perceive services as less affordable and spend 
less on them. 
George et al. (2011) explained how behavioural biases and receiving a lower 
income frequently interact in groups of vulnerable citizens. For example, being on a low 
income means citizens are less likely to have access to cheaper credit and payment 
methods, complicating decision-making further. If the factors associated with H1 
(poorer decision-making as regards the price paid for the service) and H2 (restricted 
service consumption derived from lower income) are combined for a group of citizens, 
they may be paying a higher unit price while participating less in the market, mutually 
compensating the effect on expenditure. So:    
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H3. Vulnerable citizens perceive services as less affordable, though they do not 
exhibit different expenditure decisions on them. 
Finally, another possibility is that vulnerable citizens do not experience 
particular difficulties as regards service consumption. In this case, no significant 
differences between groups of vulnerable and other citizens as regards perceived service 
affordability are observed, so any differences in expenditure may be derived from 
various quantities purchased resulting from different needs and/or preferences. Hence: 
H4. Vulnerable citizens do not perceive services as less affordable than other 
citizens.  
    
 
Public infrastructure services and vulnerable citizens: Does country matter? 
 
Market reform of public services risks “empowering” some citizens while 
“disempowering” others (Clifton et al., 2011). But does the country context in which 
citizens reside shape vulnerability? 
Most social science would predict that the context in which citizens live matters 
(Lunn, 2012). Lavrijssen (2014) argues that country specificities, such as regulation, 
legal systems and norms, income structures, climate and culture, all impact on citizen 
experiences. However, to date, only a few empirical analyses of citizen experiences 
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with public infrastructure services have considered multiple countries in their sample, 
usually by including country dummy variables as controls. This approach has permitted 
controlling for country differences when estimating the general effects of regulation on 
citizens (Bacchiocchi et al., 2011; Fiorio and Florio, 2011) or the effects of citizens’ 
specific socio-economic characteristics on their consumption experiences (Clifton et al., 
2014). Jilke (2015), by introducing multilevel estimations, also controlled for potential 
clustering effects across countries when estimating the effects of citizens’ socio-
economic characteristics on their consumption experiences. 
 We analyse whether the consequences of the socio-economic variables 
representative of vulnerability on service expenditure and affordability differ depending 
on country context. Following Lavrijssen (2014), we take the country as an environment 
in which citizens with different socio-economic backgrounds interact with services. We 
focus on three large EU markets representing different reform maturities (advanced, 
intermediate and laggard markets) in 2006. Though EU telecommunications and 
electricity directives ensured some homogeneity across all Member States, the timing, 
sequence and extent of reform differed (Clifton et al., 2006). Market-oriented reform 
was justified by claims it would lower prices and increase choice. From the perspective 
of vulnerable citizens, then, it is of interest to enquire whether more reformed markets 
performed better than laggard markets.  
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 Our country selection is based on the evolution of telecommunications and 
electricity reform in the UK, Italy and Spain. We use data on the timing and extent of 
reform in both markets from the OECD (2016). Telecommunications reform 
commenced before electricity reform, and was implemented faster and more 
completely, driven by technological change. The UK pioneered telecommunications 
reform in the EU: liberalization commenced from 1982 and was completed in a decade. 
By 1992, competition was real, as diverse new entrants had made significant inroads 
into market share. Privatization commenced from 1984 and was also completed early, 
by 1997. Spain represents an intermediate market: liberalization commenced in 1994, 
though the incumbent retained market share for longer than in the UK. New entrants 
took one decade longer in Spain than the UK to achieve market penetration. 
Privatization was promoted gradually, and was fully achieved in the late 1990s. Italy 
was a laggard: liberalization began from 1993, though the market penetration by new 
entrants proceeded at a similar pace to Spain. Privatization started from 1992 and was 
completed by 2003.    
Electricity reform proceeded more slowly and unevenly across the EU. The UK 
commenced in 1990, reaching full liberalization by 1998. Vertical integration was 
reduced from 1990, maturing by 2001. The sector was fully privatized by 2002. Spain 
was an intermediate reformer: formal liberalization commenced in 1994 and was fully 
implemented by 2003, while vertical disintegration started later than in the UK. 
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Privatization occurred gradually and service provision was largely private by 2006. Italy 
was the laggard again: liberalization commenced in 1999 and was completed by 2007, 
while vertical disintegration commenced later than in the UK and Spain, from 1999, and 
progressed slowly. Privatization started from 2000 and state ownership still accounted 
for nearly one third of the incumbent by 2006.  
Hence, by 2006, despite different timings, telecommunications reform was 
virtually accomplished in the UK, and advanced in Spain and Italy. In contrast, 
electricity reform had advanced most in the UK, followed by Spain, then Italy. So, by 
2006, telecommunications reform had produced three, relatively homogeneous markets, 
while electricity reform was incomplete and irregular. Citizens in telecommunications 
markets across the three countries faced a significantly reformed market, which presents 
new, but similar, complexities for vulnerable citizens. In contrast, vulnerable citizens in 
electricity markets faced more moderately, and less uniformly, reformed markets, so 
their experiences may differ less to those of other citizen groups, but be more varied by 
country. From this, we build our fifth and sixth hypotheses, central to our analysis of 
country differences:    
H5. Difficulties experienced by vulnerable citizens are more frequent, and more 
intense in telecommunications than in electricity markets. 
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H6. Difficulties experienced by vulnerable citizens in telecommunications 
markets are generalized across countries, whilst difficulties in electricity markets are 
more country-specific.  
 
Data and methodology 
Following Whitehead et al. (2008) we conduct a complementary analysis of citizens’ 
RP and SP for telecommunications and electricity services, in order to compare the 
results in the UK, Italy and Spain. 
The main sources for analysing SP on public infrastructure services are  
Eurobarometers (EB). We use microdata from EC (2007), a unique Eurobarometer 
providing insight on all citizens’ opinions (both users and non-users) about services. It 
also provides a breakdown of citizens’ socio-economic background. EC (2007) includes 
a sample of 1,337 individuals (UK), 1,006 (Spain) and 1,024 (Italy). We take as the 
dependent variable perceived service affordability, obtained from citizen responses, for 
each service, to the question: “In general, would you say that the price of […] is 
affordable or not?”. 
For RP, we use the information obtained, gathered and homogenized from 
Household Budget Surveys (HBSs) from the UK (ONS, 2006), Italy (ISTAT, 2006) and 
Spain (INE, 2006). These national surveys collect information on households’ 
expenditure broadly disaggregated, and on the socio-economic characteristics of the 
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household representative. These provide large samples of 6,645 households (UK), 
19,435 (Spain) and 23,639 (Italy). Our dependent variable is the logarithm of 
households’ expenditure on a category of services (electricity and telecommunications), 
in euros per year. Here, telecommunications (fixed, mobile and internet) are considered 
as a joint category, since no disaggregation of individual services is conducted in the 
HBSs. 
We interpret our results using insights from behavioural sciences (Lunn, 2012), 
rather than on assumptions about agents’ behaviour, such as absolute rationality. To 
contrast SP and RP, we develop a comparison analysis, as defined by Whitehead et al. 
(2008): first, we perform separate regression analyses on both sources; then, we 
interpret this evidence jointly, according to the scenarios next described. We follow 
Kahneman and Thaler’s (2006) behavioural approach to decision-making: first, 
individuals take a decision (RP); then, they express a perception based on the results 
obtained (SP). Firstly, analysing SP, we consider a difficulty exists for a group of 
vulnerable citizens when their specific socio-economic characteristic is associated with 
lower perceptions of service affordability. Next, we analyse RP to evaluate if this is 
reflected in different expenditure decisions. 
Assuming that expenditure on a service is derived from a unit price multiplied 
by quantity purchased, we interpret the results according to four scenarios (Figure 1). 
Scenario 1, corresponding to H1, is where a socio-economic group is associated with 
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lower perceptions of service affordability, but greater expenditure on the service. 
Scenario 2 (H2) is where a socio-economic group is associated with lower perceptions 
of service affordability and also lower service expenditure. In scenario 3 (H3) a socio-
economic group is associated with lower perceptions of service affordability but non-
significant differences as regards expenditure. This scenario may result from a 
combination of lower consumption and a higher unit price paid, or may reflect 
dissatisfaction with other aspects of service provision. Finally, scenario 4 (H4) applies 
where no significant differences are observed regarding service affordability.  
The scenarios, as the hypotheses, are mutually exclusive. Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 
indicate the existence of particular difficulties for vulnerable citizens, whilst scenario 4 
reflects that this is not the case. 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Do the experiences of vulnerable citizens as regards these services differ 
depending on country context? We first perform general estimations for the three 
countries to contrast which scenario applies to each service and socio-economic group. 
Then, we reproduce the estimations introducing interaction effects between each socio-
economic dimension and the country of residence. We use the UK as reference in these 
additional estimations, so the effect for each socio-economic variable represents the 
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effect of that characteristic for those living in the UK. The interaction effect of each 
socio-economic variable and the country (Italy and Spain) indicates the effect that 
characteristic has upon those living in Italy and Spain, respectively, versus those in the 
UK. So, we establish the scenario applicable for the “first-mover” UK, and see whether 
this coincides with a “follower” (Spain) and a “laggard” (Italy). 
To operationalize the empirical analysis, as regards SP, from the information 
provided by EC (2007) we define a binary variable y, being:  
yi = 1, if the individual i states the service is “affordable”.  
yi = 0, otherwise. 
Assuming that the probability of service affordability is distributed as a standard 
normal, we relate y to a vector of independent variables x, through the following probit 
model: 
)()1Pr( ii xy   
From this model, we estimate the marginal effects of each independent variable 
xj on the dependent variable, using the following equation: 
 ji
ij
i x
x
y
 )(
)1Pr(



 
These marginal effects reflect the estimated change in the probability of 
perceiving the service as affordable associated with a unitary change in each 
independent variable. 
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As regards RP, for each category of services, the dependent variable is analysed 
using: 
iii uxEXP  )ln(  
Where: 
EXPi is household i expenditure on a category of services. 
xi is a vector of independent variables for household i. 
Independent variables were selected based on the citizen vulnerability literature 
(OECD, 2008; George et al., 2011). We select variables where available and 
comparable data are available both in the Eurobarometer and the HBSs. These are: 1) 
Education, citizens with basic education (EDUCBAS) versus citizens with higher 
education (category of reference), incorporating secondary education as a control 
variable; 2) Age, citizens over 64 (AGE>64) versus younger citizens (considering those 
between 35 and 49 as the category of reference), including those under 35 and those 
between 50 and 64 as controls; and 3) Employment status, non-employed 
(NOEMPLOYED) versus employed citizens. In RP, this information refers to all 
household members (for employment), and to the reference person of the household 
according to the survey (for education and age). We also include control variables 
available in both SP and RP: country of residence, controlling for the differential 
elements linked to country context (in particular, country differences in satisfaction with 
life in general or satisfaction with services provided); household size (capturing the 
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effect of scale on consumption); housing occupancy status (differentiating home-owners 
and the rest); and gender. For RP, we also include the logarithm of household 
equivalent expenditure (according to the OECD modified scale).  
 
Results 
 
Estimations for service affordability (SP) and for service expenditure (RP) are shown in 
Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Table 3 summarises results obtained for each sector and 
country, interpreted according to the four scenarios.  
 
TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE 
 
Telecommunications 
Education 
From the general estimations, we find that perceptions of service affordability are lower 
for citizens with basic education for all the telecommunications services when 
compared to better-educated citizens. The gap differs according to the technology, being 
highest for internet (-17.9% of probability of perceiving the service as affordable). 
Results from RP show that expenditure on telecommunications by lesser-educated 
citizens is lower than that by better-educated citizens. For these citizens, lower service 
23 
 
affordability, combined with lower expenditure, is captured by scenario 2: they restrict 
their consumption in telecommunications markets by limiting the amount of the service 
they purchase and/or their quality. 
Does country matter? Using country interactions, we find that the lower 
perceptions of affordability of telecommunications among the less-educated are 
observed in the UK for mobile telephony and the internet. Results for Italy and Spain in 
SP, when compared to the UK, are similar, except that internet affordability among the 
less-educated is even lower in Italy. But country differences exist as regards RP: in the 
UK, the less-educated are not associated with lower expenditure on 
telecommunications, whilst in Italy and Spain they are. So, scenario 2 holds when 
interpreting the results in Italy and Spain. In the UK, the explanation needs to be 
combined with a higher unit price paid, or with dissatisfaction with other dimensions 
(scenario 3). 
 
Age 
Citizens over 64 perceive the internet (-27.8%) and mobile telephony (-18.8%) as less 
affordable than the reference group (those between 35 and 49). This is not observed for 
fixed telephony. As regards RP, expenditure on telecommunications among citizens 
over 64 is generally higher. The elderly exhibit inertia, opting to use fixed telephones 
more than younger citizens, instead of newer technologies such as mobile and internet 
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services (Clifton et al., 2014). In consequence, older citizens obtain poorer results: they 
are less satisfied but pay more for telecommunications (for example, using a fixed 
phone to call a mobile) (scenario 1).  
Introducing country interactions, lower perceived affordability among the 
elderly is observed in all three countries for mobile telephony and internet (particularly 
in the UK). Regarding fixed telephony, in the UK, the elderly perceive the service as 
more affordable than younger citizens, but this is not observed in Italy and Spain. As 
regards RP, expenditure on telecommunications among the elderly is greater than for 
other citizens in the UK. However, this effect is unclear in Italy and Spain. Scenario 1 
reflects the situation of older citizens in telecommunications markets in the UK (except 
for fixed telephony), whilst Italy and Spain are closer to scenario 3. 
  
Employment 
Considering the general estimations, non-employed citizens perceive mobile telephony 
and internet as slightly less affordable services than other citizens (-4.4%, in both 
cases). This effect is non-significant for fixed telephony. As regards RP, expenditure on 
telecommunications among these citizens is lower. Lower service affordability 
combined with lower expenditure may reflect particular difficulties of the non-
employed in telecommunications, translated into a reduced participation (consumption) 
(scenario 2). As in the case of lesser-educated citizens, the non-employed restrict 
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consumption in telecommunications markets. Difficulties experienced by these citizens 
may be compounded by their receiving lower and less predictable incomes (George et 
al., 2011).  
Introducing country interactions, lower perceived affordability of mobile 
telephony, the internet and fixed telephony is observed among the non-employed in the 
UK. In Spain, the results do not significantly differ from those in the UK. However, in 
Italy, the relationship is unclear. Regarding RP, expenditure on telecommunications in 
the UK is lower for the non-employed than for their counterparts. This effect is similar 
in Italy and Spain. Hence, in the UK and Spain, scenario 2 best represents the situation 
of non-employed citizens in telecommunications markets, while, for Italy, scenario 4 is 
more appropriate. 
 
Electricity 
Education 
The first general estimations show that less-educated citizens perceive electricity as less 
affordable (-7.4%), and spend less on the service than better-educated citizens (scenario 
2). However, when introducing country interactions, we observe that, in the UK, basic 
education is not associated with lower affordability perceptions. Spain shows a similar 
result but, in Italy, basic education is associated with lower perceived service 
affordability, compared to the UK. As regards RP, expenditure on electricity is lower 
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among less-educated UK citizens, but this effect is unclear in Italy and Spain. 
Interpretation of the results differs by country. In the UK and Spain, no particular 
difficulties are detected for less-educated citizens, and expenditure differences can be 
explained by a lower quantity purchased (scenario 4). However, in Italy, lower service 
affordability combined with unclear effects on expenditure (scenario 3) may result from 
lower consumption combined with a higher unit price (i.e., resulting from poorer energy 
saving strategies), or it may reflect dissatisfaction with other aspects of service 
provision.  
 
Age 
In the first general estimations, no significant differences in electricity affordability are 
detected between older citizens and the reference category. Thus, greater expenditure on 
the service observed can be interpreted as a result of a larger quantity purchased 
(scenario 4). Introducing country interactions, this appears to be the case of the UK, and 
also Italy, as non-significant differences in SP are observed between both countries. 
However, in Spain, older citizens are less satisfied with electricity affordability, whilst 
the effect of this characteristic on expenditure is unclear (scenario 3). 
 
Employment 
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No general differences in service affordability perceptions are found. As regards RP, 
expenditure on electricity by the non-employed is generally lower than by the 
employed. Introducing country interactions, differences in service affordability 
regarding employment are non-significant. Thus, differences in expenditure on 
electricity affecting those not employed can be interpreted in all three countries 
according to different quantities purchased (scenario 4). 
  
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Conclusions 
 
Practitioners and scholars worry whether all citizens are equally able to deal with the 
increasing complexity produced after market-oriented reform of public services: the 
salience of “vulnerable citizens” has risen on political agendas (EC, 2012; EP, 2012; 
ECCG, 2013). Initial research proxied socio-economic features associated with 
vulnerability and examined these as regards citizen satisfaction and behaviour. 
However, most studies were nationally based, and little was known about how country 
contexts influenced experiences of vulnerability (Lavrijssen, 2014).  
We comparatively analysed country differences as regards the relation between 
citizens’ socio-economic background and their experiences in electricity and 
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telecommunications markets, focusing on three dimensions representative of 
vulnerability. We established that socio-economic differences mattered as regards 
citizen expenditure and service affordability, and then tested if and how country 
differences might influence vulnerable citizens’ experiences. We selected three 
countries to represent pioneer, follower and laggard reform experiences, and two sectors 
where reform had been relatively fast and homogeneous (telecommunications) and slow 
and heterogeneous (electricity). Using reform and regulation as a proxy for country 
differences, we anticipated that vulnerable citizens from different countries might 
experience similar, significant problems in markets where reform had advanced 
uniformly, whereas citizens might experience diverse and less significant challenges 
where market reform was slower. Given the faster and uniform pace of 
telecommunications reform, we surmised country context would matter more in 
electricity than telecommunications markets. 
We established that citizens characterised by specific socio-economic 
backgrounds associated with vulnerability frequently perceived services were less 
affordable while they exhibited different service expenditure patterns when compared to 
other citizen groups. We interpreted these results using four possible scenarios. Overall, 
as predicted, the main difficulties detected were concentrated in telecommunications 
services, particularly in the newest ones: mobile telephony and the internet. Vulnerable 
citizens reduced their participation in telecommunications markets (particularly, less-
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educated citizens and those who did not work), or restricted their use in favour of more 
traditional and less efficient services (particularly, older citizens).  
We also found that most of the difficulties in telecommunications markets for 
vulnerable groups appear across all three countries. However, country context did 
matter since the concrete scenario to understand problems experienced by vulnerable 
citizens frequently differed depending on the country. Country context was particularly 
important for electricity. Though problems experienced by vulnerable citizens were less 
frequent than for telecommunications, they were also more country-specific. While no 
particular issues were found in the UK, in Italy, challenges were apparent for less-
educated citizens, and in Spain, for older citizens.  
The interaction between socio-economic characteristics and country contexts 
offers further interesting insights. Less-educated citizens are more frequently associated 
with difficulties as regards the three services in Italy than the UK and Spain. 
Conversely, the non-employed are more frequently associated with problems in the UK 
and Spain than in Italy. Country-specific and contextual factors are important for the 
definition of vulnerability. Thus, the interaction between country context and socio-
economic background is instrumental for a real understanding of public infrastructure 
services from the citizen perspective.  
These findings provide evidence for practitioners seeking to reinforce social 
cohesion and equity through improving the experiences of vulnerable groups in public 
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infrastructure markets. Armed with more detailed empirical evidence about specific 
contexts, regulation can be used to improve citizen satisfaction. Regulation can target 
specific citizens found to be experiencing challenges in concrete public services. For 
example, clearer, accessible information and support to switch service provider should 
ease the challenges faced by elderly citizens. More surveys, comparable across 
countries and time, would facilitate the application of techniques such as panel data 
analysis and multilevel analysis to deepen analysis. Furthermore, work is needed to 
explore the interaction between the effects of different socio-economic dimensions 
representative of vulnerability, such as non-employed and being less educated.  
Finally, country context matters: difficulties faced by specific socio-economic 
groups may be more or less intense and homogeneous in different contexts. This has 
practical use for practitioners. First, new regulation can be prioritized in those markets 
and for those socio-economic groups where difficulties are most intense. Second, where 
difficulties are homogeneous, common approaches to regulation may be optimal; where 
difficulties are heterogeneous, specific approaches are required. Incorporating these 
insights into regulation is a promising means of ensuring the benefits of reform reach all 
citizens.  
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Figure 1. Contrasting stated and revealed preferences: four scenarios to interpret results 
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Table 1. Marginal effects on services affordability 
 Variable Electricity Fixed tel. Mobile tel. Internet 
EDUCBAS -0.074***  -0.082***  -0.115***  -0.179***  
 (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  
   EDUCBAS (UK)  -0.012  -0.036  -0.130***  -0.144*** 
  (0.037)  (0.039)  (0.036)  (0.036) 
   EDUCBAS-ITA (vs UK)  -0.133***  -0.056  -0.000  -0.076* 
  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.043)  (0.044) 
   EDUCBAS-SPA (vs UK)  -0.024  -0.062  0.048  -0.038 
  (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.044)  (0.044) 
EDUCSEC -0.074*** -0.072*** -0.065** -0.060** -0.058** -0.060** -0.096*** -0.099*** 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
EDUCUNIV (ref.)         
AGE<35 -0.005 -0.007 0.003 0.001 0.036 0.037 0.050** 0.050** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) 
AGE 35-49 (ref.)         
AGE 50-64 -0.017 -0.018 0.036 0.032 -0.028 -0.031 -0.045* -0.048* 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) 
AGE>64 -0.065**  0.004  -0.188***  -0.278***  
 (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.032)  
   AGE>64 (UK)  -0.025  0.095**  -0.195***  -0.366*** 
  (0.046)  (0.048)  (0.041)  (0.041) 
   AGE>64-ITA (vs UK)  -0.000  -0.112*  0.054  0.160** 
  (0.061)  (0.062)  (0.059)  (0.067) 
   AGE>64-SPA (vs UK)  -0.138***  -0.152***  -0.049  0.125** 
  (0.055)  (0.056)  (0.051)  (0.054) 
NOEMPLOYED -0.012  -0.031  -0.044**  -0.044**  
 (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  
   NOEMPLOYED (UK.)  -0.040  -0.099***  -0.083**  -0.078** 
  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.033) 
   NOEMPLOYED-ITA (vs UK)  0.021  0.128***  0.088*  0.075 
  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.045) 
   NOEMPLOYED-SPA (vs UK)  0.070  0.048  0.012  0.031 
  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.046) 
1PERSON -0.021 -0.023 -0.048* -0.045* -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.082*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) 
2PERSONS (ref.)    0.011     
3PERSONS -0.022 -0.023 0.012 0.011 0.024 0.022 0.014 0.013 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
4PERSONS -0.085*** -0.088*** 0.007 0.003 0.016 0.012 0.065** 0.063** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
>4PERSONS -0.043 -0.048 -0.003 -0.005 -0.019 -0.026 0.013 0.008 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
WOMAN -0.014 -0.014 0.011 0.012 -0.000 -0.002 -0.047*** -0.047*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
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NOHOUSEOWN -0.079*** -0.076*** -0.112*** -0.111*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.105*** -0.105*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
UK (ref.)         
ITALY -0.232*** -0.179*** -0.313*** -0.327*** -0.160*** -0.217*** -0.220*** -0.246*** 
 (0.020) (0.032) (0.019) (0.031) (0.020) (0.032) (0.020) (0.031) 
SPAIN -0.124*** -0.126*** -0.207*** -0.164*** -0.148*** -0.169*** -0.148*** -0.165*** 
 (0.021) (0.036) (0.021) (0.037) (0.020) (0.037) (0.021) (0.036) 
N 3,367 3,367 3,367 3,367 3,367 3,367 3,367 3,367 
Wald chi2 174.55 200.91 287.24 312.95 274.05 339.61 381.44 499.60 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). 
 
 
Table 2. Estimates on households’ expenditure on the services 
 Variable Electricity Telecommunications 
Constant term 1.650*** 1.628*** -0.428** -0.549** 
 (0.219) (0.216) (0.218) (0.220) 
EDUCBAS -0.083***  -0.121***  
 (0.030)  (0.027)  
   EDUCBAS (UK)  -0.220***  -0.022 
  (0.058)  (0.046) 
   EDUCBAS-ITA (vs UK)  0.235***  -0.117*** 
  (0.056)  (0.044) 
   EDUCBAS-SPA (vs UK)  0.168***  -0.206*** 
  (0.058)  (0.051) 
EDUCSEC -0.058* -0.067* -0.041 -0.038 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) 
EDUCUNIV (ref.)     
AGE<35 -0.128*** -0.115*** -0.046 -0.034 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.036) (0.036) 
AGE35-49 (ref.)     
AGE 50-64 0.221*** 0.225*** 0.127*** 0.122*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022) 
AGE>64 0.385***  0.109***  
 (0.038)  (0.033)  
   AGE>64 (UK)  0.877***  0.276*** 
  (0.083)  (0.069) 
   AGE>64-ITA (vs UK)  -0.787***  -0.314*** 
  (0.079)  (0.070) 
   AGE>64-SPA (vs UK)  -0.735***  -0.164*** 
  (0.083)  (0.077) 
NOEMPLOYED -0.124***  -0.333***  
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 (0.042)  (0.038)  
   NOEMPLOYED (UK)  -0.308***  -0.365*** 
  (0.083)  (0.071) 
   NOEMPLOYED-ITA (vs UK)  0.290***  0.102 
  (0.082)  (0.071) 
   NOEMPLOYED-SPA (vs 
UK) 
 0.341***  -0.020 
  (0.086)  (0.079) 
ONEMPLOYED 0.003 0.002 -0.087*** -0.086*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021) 
1PERSON -0.262*** -0.276*** -0.456*** -0.469*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) 
2PERSONS (ref.)     
3PERSONS 0.203*** 0.209*** 0.281*** 0.282*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025) 
4PERSONS 0.373*** 0.369*** 0.444*** 0.444*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.029) (0.029) 
>4PERSONS 0.512*** 0.524*** 0.640*** 0.651*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.038) (0.038) 
WOMAN -0.042 -0.025 0.128*** 0.139*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.023) (0.023) 
NOHOUSEOWN -0.437*** -0.421*** -0.094*** -0.101*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.024) (0.024) 
LnEXPENDITUREeq 0.422*** 0.423*** 0.685*** 0.690*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
UK (ref.)     
ITALY 0.283*** 0.299*** -0.085*** 0.023 
 (0.025) (0.034) (0.021) (0.028) 
SPAIN 0.099*** 0.113*** 0.002 0.149*** 
 (0.027) (0.036) (0.024) (0.033) 
N 49,719 49,719 49,719 49,719 
F 108.35 132.59 273.67 238.73 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
Table 3. Summary of the scenario/hypothesis applying to each service, socio-economic 
dimension and country 
SERVICE SOCIO-
ECONOMIC 
CHARACTERI
STIC 
GENERAL 
SCENARIO  
COUNTRY COUNTRY-
SPECIFIC 
SCENARIO 
Telecommunications 
Lesser-educated   2   
UK   3  
Italy  2   
Spain  2   
Older 1    
UK 1    
Italy   3  
Spain   3  
Non-employed  2   
UK  2   
Italy    4 
Spain  2   
Electricity 
Less educated  2   
UK    4 
Italy   3  
Spain    4 
Older    4 
UK    4 
Italy    4 
Spain   3  
Non-employed    4 
UK    4 
Italy    4 
Spain    4 
 
 
